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and mathematical fields (STEM). We provide quantitative bases for this well-known fact and illustrate its 
consequences for the productivity growth in other sectors over the period 1980-2014. First, we find that the share 
of STEM talents grew significantly faster in finance than in other key STEM sectors such as high-tech, and this 
divergent pattern has been more evident for STEM than for general skills and more pronounced for investment 
banking. Second, this trend did not reverse after the Great Recession, and a persistent wage premium is found for 
STEM graduates working in finance and especially in typical financial jobs at the top of the wage distribution. Third, 
the brain drain of STEM talents into finance has been associated with a cumulative loss of labor productivity growth 
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be enough to reignite sluggish economic growth without making their employment in finance more costly. 
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1 Introduction
Over the past four decades, the financial sector has become a magnet for grad-
uates in the science, technology, engineering and mathematical fields (STEM
henceforth) who would otherwise be able to carry out research activities in the
real economy. For instance, almost 1/3 of the 33,000 employers working full-
time at Goldman Sachs are engineers and programmers, and roughly 1/5 of new
physics graduates accept a job in the financial sector, which is more than those
who go to work in high-tech industries.1 Highly talented STEM graduates in
particular have been increasingly attracted to careers in finance by the spectac-
ular earnings rise in the financial sector (Kaplan and Rauh, 2010; Philippon and
Reshef, 2012; Bell and van Reenen, 2014). Two flagship examples of top sci-
entists working in the financial industry are James Simons, the mathematician
founder of Renaissance Technologies, the world’s best performing hedge fund,
and Ryan Buckingham, a top particle physicist, who recently joined Goldman
Sachs.2 According to James Weatherall, the author of bestselling book “The
Physics of Finance,” Renaissance Technologies is “the best physics and mathe-
matics department in the world”.
These patterns are also evident in the data. Goldin and Katz (2008) and Ke-
drosky and Stangler (2011) find that the share of Harvard and MIT graduates,
respectively, entering the financial sector increased substantially in younger co-
horts compared to older ones. Celerier and Vallee (2015) show that the share
of graduates from top French engineering schools employed in finance increased
from 2% in 1986 to 8% in 2011. Using US census data over a century, Philippon
and Reshef (2012) document that wages and skills increased dramatically in the
financial sector since the 1980s. Although their focus was not on STEM skills,
the authors also document a robust increase in the use of math skills by the
financial sector compared to the rest of the economy. Boustanifar et al. (2016)
provide the first international evidence on the evolution of wages and skills in
finance confirming the upskilling trend, although with substantial exceptions.
The first contribution of this paper is to extend the influential study of
Philippon and Reshef (2012) with a dedicated focus on STEM workers. We
believe that this extension is of paramount importance given that STEM com-
petences are fundamental for innovation and economic growth. We study the
crucial 1980-2014 period, during which financial sector deregulation took place
and automation in finance has accelerated. In doing so, we compare the evolu-
tion of the share of STEM workers in finance with that of other large employers
of STEM professionals, such as the high-tech manufacturing sector. We use
two main data sources: i. the decennial Census, in which we can only observe
STEM workers and their general educational attainments, is used to carry out
a long-term analysis; ii. the 2009 to 2014 releases of the American Commu-
nity Survey, which also contains information on the workers’ degrees by fields
of study and thus on the distribution of STEM graduates across sectors. Re-
1For more on this, see: http://uk.businessinsider.com/goldman-sachs-has-more-
engineers-than-facebook-2015-4 and http://www.cityjobs.com/cityblog/2015/05/06/banks-
physics-maths-grads/.
2See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/10188335/Quants-the-maths-geniuses-running-
Wall-Street.html and http://news.efinancialcareers.com/uk-en/141013/goldman-sachs-hires-
particle-physicist-from-the-large-hadron-collider. See also the interesting debate between
Robert Shiller and Vivek Wadwha, http://wadhwa.com/2014/04/04/the-economist-goldman-
versus-google-a-career-on-wall-street-or-in-silicon-valley/.
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gardless of the dataset used, we document that conditional on educational at-
tainment, demographic characteristics and proxies of technology adoption, the
share of STEM talents employed in finance has grown significantly faster than
in other key sectors, especially in the 1980s and the early 2000s. Compared to
Philippon and Reshef (2012), we find that the divergence between finance and
other key sectors is more pronounced for STEM than for standard measures of
human capital. Moreover, using recent waves of the American Community Sur-
vey, which contains information on degree field, we find that STEM graduates
are paid significantly more in financial jobs, especially at the top of the wage
distribution.
The second contribution of this paper regards the implications of such STEM
reallocation into finance for productivity growth and technological progress in
the real economy. These implications have so far remained relatively unexplored
with the distinct exception of Kneer (2013b). Two forces make it difficult to
predict the impact of such STEM reallocation. First, given that STEM talents
are a key input of research, development and innovation activities, the concern
is that the brain drain of STEM talent to finance may reduce a country’s ca-
pacity to sustain long-term growth, which ultimately depends on technological
progress.3 On the other hand, a well-consolidated literature has found a positive
relationship between a country’s financial development and growth (e.g. Levine,
2005), although this relationship becomes negative at high levels of financial de-
velopment (Law and Singh, 2014). Among the explanations of this reversal, the
absorption of talent into finance has played a central role in the recent debate
(Kneer, 2013b; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2015). To tackle this issue at the sec-
toral level, we estimate a standard productivity equation augmented for STEM
human capital and compute counterfactual productivity changes in the absence
of the reallocation of STEM talent to finance. We find that the reallocation of
STEM talents into finance has been de facto a misallocation, especially in the
manufacturing sector. We estimate a counterfactual impact that is relatively
small for the whole economy (approximately 1.1% in terms of lower cumulative
productivity growth) but modestly large for the manufacturing sector (approxi-
mately 6.6% in terms of lower cumulative productivity growth reaching 9.7% in
high-tech sectors), which also experienced the largest decline of STEM input.
The theoretical literature on talent’s misallocation and growth is a source of
inspiration for our empirical analysis. Key in this literature is the distinction
between productive and unproductive activities (Baumol, 1990). If a productive
activity (i.e., entrepreneurship) is rewarded less than an unproductive activity
(i.e., rent seeking), growth slows down because the best talents opt for ca-
reers in unproductive activities.4 The classical analysis of Murphy et al. (1991)
suggests that the rewards of entrepreneurship relative to those of rent seeking
3This concern was loudly voiced in the public press in the aftermath of the Great Recession.
For instance:“The new players in the financial markets, the kingpins of the future who had
the capacity to reshape those markets, were a different breed: the Chinese guy who had spent
the previous ten years in American universities, the French particle physicist from FERMAT
lab; the Russian aerospace engineer; the Indian PhD in electrical engineering. “There were
just thousands of these people,” said Schwall. “Basically all of them with advanced degrees.
I remember thinking to myself how unfortunate it was that so many engineers were joining
these firms to exploit investors rather than solving public problems.” See Lewis (2015, p.
121).
4A classical and empirically well-documented example is that of the natural resource curse.
In the presence of weak institutions, a windfall of natural resources may induce talented indi-
viduals to spend most of their time in activities related to the exploitation of these resources
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are positively affected by the size and the contestability of the market and by
the protection of property rights. Their cross-country regressions confirm that
while rent-seeking is harmful for economic growth, entrepreneurship has a pos-
itive effect on growth.5 More recently, Philippon (2010) studied an economy
with explicit career choices and in which engineer-entrepreneurs need financiers
because of borrowing constraints. The optimal policy can be to either tax
or subsidize the financial sector depending on whether external economies are
more sensitive to the aggregate level of investment (thus, relaxing the borrow-
ing constraint is growth enhancing) than to the number of entrepreneurs (thus
suggesting that finance should be taxed to prevent a brain drain of talents).
Lockwood et al. (2017) propose a theoretical framework in which progressive
taxation is seen as a sort of Pigouvian tax to tackle the externalities generated
in different professions. If higher-paying industries such as finance generate
fewer positive externalities than lower-paying ones, progressive taxation can be
efficiency enhancing. Finally, an active strand of literature builds models of tal-
ent misallocations to explain the extent to which the astonishing rise in finance
earnings premiums, especially in top positions, is a pure rent or is associated
with a change in the skill distribution within the financial sector (Axelson and
Bond, 2015; Glode and Lowery, 2016; Bolton et al., 2016).6 While we provide
new evidence of a wage premium for STEM graduates working in finance com-
pared to other key sectors, we also evaluate how the reallocation of STEM talent
affects the performance of the real economy.
Both the nature of jobs and the workforce composition within sectors have
changed significantly in past four decades, and finance is no exception. Two
facts are well documented by an active strand of the literature on the impact of
new technologies on the labor market.7 First, a large fraction of tasks performed
within each job becomes more complex and less routinized, meaning that non-
engineering and technical jobs may also require advanced analytic skills. Second,
because digital and computer technologies are general purpose technologies, all
sectors started automating and robotizing their production processes, hence
requiring a larger share of high-skill workers with a strong technical and scientific
(i.e., patronage, bribe, etc.) rather than in activities characterized by increasing returns to
scale or positive externalities (i.e., innovation). See, e.g., Sachs and Warner (1995), Mehlum
et al. (2006), Robinson et al. (2006). Yet another strand of the literature examines the mis-
allocation associated with gender and ethnic discrimination, the removal of which explains a
large fraction of US productivity growth over the past 50 years (Hsieh et al., 2013).
5Interestingly, the idea that STEM workers are drivers of economic growth is incorporated
in their measure of entrepreneurship, which is the share of college enrollment in engineering
as opposed to rent seeking as measured by the share of college enrollment in law. Engineering
studies allow one to obtain a comparative advantage in complex mathematical and problem
solving tasks that can be then used to develop new technologies. In turn, law studies enable
one to master language, rhetoric and communication skills, which are essential in successful
exploitation of existing technologies.
6The empirical literature on finance and inequality at the top of the distribution is too
extensive to be reviewed here. See, e.g., Kaplan and Rauh (2010), Philippon and Reshef (2012)
and Bell and van Reenen (2014). Bell and van Reenen (2014) emphasize the importance of
having good data on all types of compensation received by bankers. The recent papers of
Celerier and Vallee (2015) and Bohm et al. (2015) have the advantage of using a very precise
measure of engineering talent (the school where an engineer graduated and standardized test
scores, respectively) and thus are particularly suitable for disentangling the role of skills and
moral hazard in explaining the finance wage premium.
7Refer, among others, to the classical works of Katz and Murphy (1992), Acemoglu (1998),
Autor et al. (1998), Autor et al. (2003), Acemoglu and Autor (2011), Goos et al. (2014),
Beaudry et al. (2016).
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backgrounds to operate these technologies. These two trends imply a fiercer
sectoral competition for the workers endowed with STEM skills that could have
contributed to substantially altering the allocation of STEM talent between jobs
and sectors.
The financial sector is a perfect case study for understanding the nuances
of the reallocation of STEM talent in the presence of the large-scale adoption
of general purpose technologies and asymmetric sectoral shocks, such as trade
shocks. First, it is well known that global imbalances increased the market
size for US financial products, while the entry of China in the WTO induced a
reduction of employment in US manufacturing (Acemoglu et al., 2016). Because
technological development is positively related to market size (Romer, 1986;
Murphy et al., 1989) and new technologies require skilled workers (Bartel et al.,
2007), in recent decades, finance may have attracted more STEM talent than
the manufacturing industry.
Second, the financial sector not only is a heavy adopter of information tech-
nologies but has also gradually become active in developing IT-related applica-
tions in fields such as data mining, information security and algorithmic trading.
These innovations have shifted the nature of the tasks performed in financial
jobs towards a more intensive use of STEM skills. The influential work by Autor
et al. (2002) describes how the set of tasks performed by bank tellers became
more complex following the introduction of digital check imaging. While this
initial task-shift mainly pertained clerical jobs, recent innovations have substan-
tially changed the nature of top financial occupations such as financial analysts.
For example, tasks such as high-frequency and automated trading require ex-
tremely high proficiency in math, coding and problem solving, which are skills
typically possessed by postgraduate workers in science and engineering. To
track changes in the nature of financial jobs, we use recent waves of the Ameri-
can Community Survey, which contain information on degree field to document
how, in typical financial jobs, the prevalence and the earnings of STEM talent
have changed.
Finally, the services of the financial sector are needed by the entire economy,
and thus, an increase in efficiency of finance may have large spillovers on the
real economy. Levine (2005) identifies five main channels through which finance
can positively affect the real economy: i) the production of information about
investment opportunities and capital allocation; ii) the mobilization and pooling
of household savings; iii) the monitoring of firms; iv) the financing of trade
and consumption; and v) risk management and the provision of liquidity and
diversification. Theoretically, one should expect these spillovers to be magnified
following the deregulation of several financial activities, such as the removal of
interest rate ceilings in the 80s and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act on the
separation of investment and commercial banks in 1999. As a key driver of
efficiency improvements, skill upgrading in finance should favor the reallocation
of capital to more productive uses. Unfortunately, on top of the astonishing
increase in financial sector wages, the two deregulation waves of the 80s and
2000s have been associated with a productivity slowdown in the real economy
(Fernald, 2015). This central role of the financial sector suggests that what
happened there and the massive STEM reallocation to finance in particular
could contribute to explaining this productivity slowdown. Our paper seeks to
provide support to the brain drain explanation put forward in a cross-country
setup by Kneer (2013a) and Cecchetti and Kharroubi (2015) focusing on the
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types of competencies that are more likely to be misallocated to finance, i.e.,
scientific, technical and engineering skills.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and the
measures of STEM skills. Section 3 documents the long-term evolution of STEM
workers across sectors, while Section 4focuses on the post-crisis period, for which
we have a better measure of STEM input. Section 5 analyses the effect of the
reallocation of STEM workers to finance on productivity in the real economy.
Section 6 concludes with a discussion of the policy implication of our analysis.
2 Data and measures
Our main sources of information about the importance of STEM workers in
the workforce are individual-level data from the decennial censuses (years 1980,
1990 and 2000) and the American Community Survey (ACS, years 2009-2014),
which is available in IPUMS (Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, see Rug-
gles et al., 2015). The data from the decennial censuses cover a 5-percent sample
of the US population, while the ACSs cover a 1-percent sample of the US pop-
ulation.
[Table 1 about here]
The ideal measure of the sectoral intensity of STEM inputs is the share of
workers with a STEM degree over the total number of employees of the sector.
Cross-sectoral differences in this measure would capture the extent to which each
sector uses STEM inputs relative to other inputs and thus benefits from public
and private investments in STEM education. To fix the ideas, Table 1 lists the
STEM fields of study grouped by field, namely, computer science, mathematics,
engineering and technology, science. However, such a degree-based measure
is only available for the period 2009-2014, when ACS data started including
systematic information on the field of study for graduate and postgraduate
workers, while no information on the field of study was collected in previous
ACS waves and in decennial censuses. Provided that the increase in the use
of STEM workers by the financial sector occurred well before this period, we
should rely on alternative measures to examine the STEM dynamics for a longer
time span.
[Table 2 about here]
A first natural alternative is to use the share of workers in STEM occupa-
tions because occupations are defined in a consistent way across different cen-
suses and ACSs (occ1990 classification). Table 2 defines the main occupational
grouping used throughout the paper. Our preferred occupation-based measure
of STEM input includes math, statistics and computer science occupations but
not engineering occupations (column 3) because these core STEM jobs repre-
sent more than 95% of STEM employment in the financial sector. Further, core
STEM jobs are those that are complementary to innovative financial activities
that intensively use ICT technologies, such as high-frequency trading and asset
management.
Notice that the demand of STEM inputs has changed in finance both because
financial companies have offered more STEM positions and because the tasks
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performed in typical financial positions, such as financial analyst (see Table 2),
became more math-oriented. Using the share of workers in core STEM occu-
pations captures only the first type of change but does not allow for a proxy of
effective STEM education allocated to finance. Our second and third measures
overcome this shortcoming by taking the share of workers in a core STEM job
with a degree or a postgraduate degree, respectively. The focus on postgrad-
uates is particularly important as they account for a large and growing share
of the college wage premium (Eckstein and va Nagypl, 2004).8 Arguably, given
the highly specific skill requirements of STEM occupations, a graduate worker
in a STEM occupation should hold a degree in a STEM-related discipline.9
The fourth measure exploits information contained in the Dictionary of Oc-
cupations and Titles (DOT), particularly the measure of the mathematical apti-
tude required for an occupation. Aggregated at the sectoral level, this measure
captures the aggregate math input used by a sector but not the specific contri-
bution of highly skilled workers, such as STEM professionals, to this input.
Following Philippon and Reshef (2012), our generic measures ystemj,t of the
STEM input’s intensity in sector j at time t are as follows:
ystemj,t =
∑
i∈j λi,thi,tIi∈stem,t∑
i∈j λi,thi,t
, (1)
where λi,t and hi,t are sample weights and hours worked, respectively, and i ∈ j
denotes that the individual i works in sector j. Ii∈stem,t is a dummy indicating
that the individual i works in a STEM job. When our measure of STEM input
takes education into account as well, Ii∈stem,t is a dummy variable that is equal
to one if i works in a STEM job and is a graduate or postgraduate. When our
measure of STEM is math aptitude from the DOT, we replace Ii∈stem,t with the
DOT math score, which varies between 1 and 5 in equation 1. Finally, for the
analysis of the sectoral distribution of STEM degrees for 2009-2014, Ii∈stem,t is
equal to one if individual i holds a STEM degree as defined in Table 1.
[Table 3 about here]
Concerning the sectoral breakdown, we aggregate finance and other key in-
dustries based on the harmonized classification ind1990 that is available both in
the decennial censuses and in ACS. The sectors, based on ind1990, are described
in detail in Table 3. Regarding finance, we follow Philippon and Reshef (2012)
and include banking; savings institutions, including credit; credit agencies n.e.c.;
securities, commodity brokerage, and investments; and insurance. In Table 3,
we also define a set of key sectors that are the main employers of STEM talent
and thus are used throughout the paper as the main comparison group. These
sectors can be divided into seven groups: knowledge-intensive business sectors
(KIBS henceforth), health, education, utilities, mining and quarrying, high-tech
manufacturing sectors (HT henceforth) and low-tech manufacturing sectors.
8We define postgraduate education as 17 or more years of education, as in Lindley and
Machin (2016).
9A detailed discussion about the overlap between degree field and occupation is conducted
in Section 3.2
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3 STEM workers in finance, 1980-2014
This section illustrates the long-term evolution of STEM human capital and
wages in the financial sector compared to other sectors. In line with the focus
on the allocation of STEM talents among alternative uses, we mostly consider
pairwise comparisons between finance and the two main employers of STEM tal-
ents; that is, the HT manufacturing sectors and KIBS. This comparison allows
us to compare the capacity of finance to attract talent with respect to sectors
that were not only early and extensive adopters of ICT but are also impor-
tant engines of sustained productivity growth, thus representing a “productive”
entrepreneurial use of scientific talents as opposed to an “unproductive” one
(Baumol, 1990). The next sub-section illustrates the unconditional differences
between finance and other sectors in the use of STEM skills, while in sub-section
3.2, we depurate these differences from observable proxies of technology, educa-
tion and the initial level of STEM skills.
3.1 Unconditional differences: finance vs. selected sectors
Table 4 describes the distribution of STEM and core STEM jobs across different
sectors in 1980 and 2014. Two salient facts emerge. First, KIBS and the
financial sector absorbed the bulk of the well-documented increase of core STEM
workers in the US economy between 1980 and 2014.10 Although KIBS were
employing only 18% of science, math and computer science workers in 1980, this
share almost doubles in 2014. At the same time, the financial sector becomes the
second-largest employer of core STEM workers, reaching 11.5% of total STEM
employment in 2014.11 Comparing the share of core STEM and STEM workers
(including engineers), it becomes apparent that core STEM job represent the
bulk of STEM employment in the financial sector. This observation justifies our
focus on core STEM workers in the remainder of the paper. Second, high- and
low-tech manufacturing industries experienced an impressive decline in their
capacity to attract core STEM employment relative to other sectors. Such large
changes in the sectoral distribution of STEMs may have had a significant effect
on the productivity growth of manufacturing in as much as STEMs represent a
key input of knowledge creation and innovation.
[Table 4 about here]
Large shifts in the distribution of STEM across sectors also reflect changes
in the weight of each sector in the US economy. The decline of manufacturing
employment may have thus mechanically driven down the number of STEM
workers employed in HT manufacturing relative to other sectors. To account
for the long-term decline in US manufacturing employment, a better measure is
the share of STEM workers within a given sector as it informs us on the extent
to which the incidence of STEM skills increases in the sectoral input mix.
[Figure 1 about here]
10According to our calculations, the share of hours worked by STEM jobs has increased
from 2.8% of the total in 1980 to 4.8% of the total in 2014. When focusing on core STEM
jobs, their share grew from 1% in 1980 to 3.2% in 2014.
11Interestingly, a recent study of the UK Commission for Employment and Skills shows that
finance is the top employer of STEM graduates in the UK with 20% of total STEM workers
(UKCES, 2015)
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The top three panels of Figure 1 depict the evolution of the share of core
STEM jobs within a sector as described by equation 1. For our three main
measures of STEM skills (the share of core STEM workers, share of core STEM
workers with a college degree and share of core STEM workers with a postgrad-
uate qualification), the growth rate is remarkably higher in the financial sector
compared to HT and KIBS. Interestingly, the divergent pattern is concentrated
in the last 15 years after the acceleration in financial sector deregulation, which
has been considered the main driver of wage and skill changes in finance by
the influential paper of Philippon and Reshef (2012). To ensure that the these
trends are not simply driven by the general boost of wages and human capital in
finance, the bottom three panels of Figure 1 show the evolution of average hourly
wages, share of college graduates and share of postgraduates in the same sectors.
Compared to the finding of Philippon and Reshef (2012), the clear message is
that at least in the period 1980-2014, the financial sector performs better than
HT manufacturing only in terms of STEM input and that the average hourly
wage paid to core STEM workers follows the same differential trend in the two
sectors. Indeed, between 1980 and 2014, the share of college graduates and
postgraduates grew faster in HT manufacturing than in finance.
[Figure 2 about here]
The fact that the tremendous acceleration in the use of STEM by the finan-
cial sector represents the most salient difference with respect to other sectors is
also evident when using the routine vs. non-routine task constructs proposed
by Autor et al. (2003).12 Figure 2 shows that the financial sector becomes less
routine intensive (top-left panel) than other key sectors by increasing the use
of both non-routine abstract tasks (i.e., math) and interactive tasks (i.e., DCP)
tasks compared to routine cognitive tasks (i.e., set standards).
[Table 5 about here]
Figure 1 illustrates the differences in STEM growth between finance and the
rest of the economy but does not actually compare the levels of STEM intensity.
The faster growth in the use of STEM in finance may merely reflect a catching-
up phenomenon that is also evident when looking at the evolution of ‘other
sectors’ but not HT and KIBS in Figure 1. Table 5 reports the level of core
STEM intensity in the key macro-sectors and confirms the strong acceleration
in STEM intensity in financial sectors compared to other key sectors. What
is striking is that in finance (and compared to other sectors), the intensity of
core STEM workers increases significantly more than the intensity of STEM
workers.13
[Figures 3 and 4 about here]
12Task scores are taken from the 1991 (revised fourth) edition of the Dictionary of Occu-
pations and Titles (DOT). More information on how this task constructs are built see (Autor
et al., 2003). The RTI index is built as the logarithm of the ratio between the importance
of routine tasks (finger dexterity and set limits, tolerances and standards) and non-routine
abstract and interactive tasks (respectively, math and DCP - direction and planning). A value
of 0 means that routine and non-routine tasks have the same importance for the occupation.
13For the sake of space, we do not report results for different financial sectors. As expected,
investment banking experienced an even more pronounced increase in STEM inputs than
other financial sectors. These results are available upon request by the authors.
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To make these trends visually evident, Figure 3 plots the relative STEM in-
tensity of finance compared to high-tech manufacturing, i.e., the ratio of STEM
intensity in finance over STEM intensity in HT. Although starting from a sub-
stantially lower point in 1980, the level of STEM skills and wages in finance
eventually reached or even passed that of HT manufacturing. This observation
confirms that the documented skill upgrading of the US financial sector mostly
pertained to STEM rather than general skills. When comparing finance with
KIBS (Figure 4), we observe that even though the share of STEM and post-
graduates in general remained significantly lower in finance than in KIBS, a
substantial catching-up between 1980 and 2014 is found for both STEM, espe-
cially STEM postgraduates, and non-STEM measures of skills.
3.2 Conditional differences: finance vs. selected sectors
A more rigorous assessment of the sectoral differences in the use of STEM
skills requires accounting for both the different exposure to (routine-replacing)
technical change and for differences in the initial share of STEM talent to cap-
ture catching-up dynamics. In doing so, we fit simple regressions of the decen-
nial change in various measures of sector-level STEM skills and human capital
against the initial STEM level, a set of explanatory variables and a dummy vari-
able for financial sector. The set of explanatory variables is intended to control
for observable characteristics of the sector that naturally affect the demand of
STEM workers. More specifically, we estimate the following equation:
4yi = α+ φyi,t−10 + βFIN Ii +X ′i,t−10γ + εi (2)
where the dependent variable yi is the 10-year (7-year for the two sub-periods
in the 2000s) difference in our measures of STEM inputs in industry i; FIN Ii
is our variable of interest and equals one for the financial sector and is zero
otherwise; yi,t−10 is included to control for initial differences in STEM inputs;
εi is the idiosyncratic error term. The vector of lagged controls X
′
i,t−10 includes
i. the index of routine intensity proposed by Autor and Dorn (2013) to account
for the scope of ICT diffusion across different sectors14; and ii. the logarithms
of the average years of schooling and the average age of the workforce, which
capture the intensity in the use of general human capital and the natural rate
of worker’s replacement, respectively. To tighten our comparison, we estimate
equation 2 only for the sub-set of 97 sectors (ind1990 classification) that are
the main employers of STEM workers (see Table 3). While these 97 sectors
represent only approximately 45% of the US economy, they employ more than
70% of the US STEM workers. The coefficient associated with the dummy
FIN Ii thus captures the conditional difference in the evolution of STEM skills
between finance and other STEM-intensive sectors.
[Table 6 about here]
Table 6 reports the estimation of equation 2 by decade. Panel A clearly
highlights that compared to other key employers of core STEM workers, the
14Recall that the index of routine intensity has been used as a proxy for the scope of
ICT adoption within a sector and thus accounts for routine replacing technical change that
disproportionately affects those sectors, such as finance, that use intensively standardized
clerical tasks (Autor et al., 2003).
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positive differential growth of STEM skills in finance is quantitatively important.
Three accelerations are observed in the decades 1980 and 1990 and after the
Great Recession (2007-2014). In the 80s, the share of core STEM workers grew
0.72 percentage points more in finance than in other key sectors. Compared to
the observed growth of the share of core STEM workers in other key sectors
over the same period (0.83 pp), the conditional growth in finance has been 87%
faster. The difference in the growth of the share of core STEM workers between
finance and other key sectors remained significantly different from zero but
slowed down substantially in the 90s. Quite surprisingly, during the period 2000-
2007, when the second wave of liberalization occurred, the difference becomes
imprecisely estimated and is no longer statistically significant. However, the
effect is large: compared to the nearly absent growth of STEM input in other
key sectors, finance keeps absorbing an increasing fraction of STEMs. Moreover,
the imprecisely estimated coefficient for dummy finance in the period 2000-
2007 masks a highly heterogeneous effect in different sub-sectors of finance. To
illustrate, Table A1 in the Appendix A replicates these estimates by replacing
the dummy finance with a dummy for investment banking, showing a large
and significant acceleration concomitant with the liberalization waves of the
80s and the early 00s. Between 2000 and 2007, the growth of STEM skills
in investment banking was significantly larger than the very small (0.02 pp)
growth of STEM inputs in other key sectors. Interestingly, Table A1 also shows,
holding everything else constant, that there has been an outflow of STEM from
investment banking as would be expected after the collapse of this specific sub-
sector in 2007.
Similar results are obtained using different measures of STEM input but with
a few important differences. For the share of graduates employed in STEM jobs
(Panel B), the relatively larger increase in finance in the 1980s and after the
Great Recession period (2007-2014) are separated by the 1990s, when STEM
input decreased in finance relative to other key sectors, although the coefficient
is only statistically significant at the 10-percent level. This finding is consistent
with the fact that the 1990s were a decade of rapid technical change and that
productivity growth in capital equipment industries was thus able to ensure
bright career opportunities for new graduates in STEM disciplines.
The second notable difference is that the share of postgraduates employed
in STEM jobs increased only in finance with respect to other key sectors after
the Great Recession (Panel C). This finding suggests that the STEM require-
ments became increasingly complex in the financial sector, possibly reflecting
the diffusion of high-frequency trading. This interpretation is corroborated by
the pattern of postgraduate hiring in STEM jobs by investment banks, which
increases significantly more than in other key sectors despite the conditional
decrease in the share of STEM jobs in this sub-sector after the Great Reces-
sion (see Table A1). In turn, using the DOT math attitude score (Panel D),
the differential trend in STEM demand from finance is uniquely concentrated
between 2000 and 2007 in both finance and investment banking. As math in-
tensity is calculated as an average across all workers, while the share of core
STEM considers only a specific subset of professionals, it is plausible that top
workers explain the bulk of the documented brain drain effect.
A third difference emerges when estimating equation 2 for postgraduates
in any discipline. Panel E shows, conditional on a host of demographic and
technological controls, that the share of postgraduates grew at a significant
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slower pace in finance than in other key sectors between 1990 and 2007.
Overall, these results reinforce and confirm the first main finding of our
paper: the skill upgrading in finance has been strongly biased toward STEM
skills. Moreover, although not uniform across the finance sub-sectors and STEM
measures, the findings after the 2000 are particularly striking given the sharp
reversal in the demand of cognitive workers documented by Beaudry et al. (2016)
and are contrary to what could be expected given the negative shock that hit
the financial sector. Benefiting from new information in the field of study in the
ACS data, the next section delves deeper into the post-crisis period.
4 STEM graduates after the Great Recession,
2009-2014
In the previous sections, we documented an acceleration in the process of STEM
workers’ reallocation toward finance. This section investigates whether these
trends persisted after the Great Recession and the subsequent regulatory changes,
notably the Dodd-Frank Act (see Krainer, 2012). As mentioned in section 2,
the advantage of using the ACS data after 2009 is that they provide detailed
information on the field of study of graduate workers. This feature is particu-
larly important for directly observing the extent to which STEM graduates are
employed in finance, either in STEM jobs or in non-STEM jobs. In addition,
we can measure the wage premium of STEM graduates in finance compared
to other sectors. Finally, we can indirectly validate the admittedly imperfect
measures of STEM skills used for the longer panel. This validation is important
for the last part of the paper, in which we evaluate the association between the
STEM brain drain into finance and productivity growth in the real economy.
4.1 Comparison of our STEM measures
Table 8 presents simple descriptive statistics for our degree-based and occupation-
based measures of STEM input across key sectors.15 Notice first that in 2009,
there is a small excess of STEM graduates (5.6% of total employment) relative
to STEM jobs (5.5% of total employment) in the US economy. The financial
sector is rather balanced, with a 6.7% share of workers that are STEM gradu-
ates (column 1) and a 7.3% (resp. 7.1%) share of workers employed in STEM
(resp. core STEM) jobs (column 4). Among the other key sectors, the excess
of STEM graduates relative to core STEM jobs is concentrated only in educa-
tion and other industries, while KIBS display a large deficit of STEM graduates
compared to STEM jobs.
[Table 8 about here]
Although the measure of STEM input based on STEM occupations rather
than degrees seems accurate in aggregate, it is also interesting to use ACS data
to further examine the distribution of STEM graduates in different occupations
in the financial sector. Based on a rich anecdotal body of evidence, we expect
that a portion of the STEM graduates employed in finance work as financial
15We extend our comparison group to include education and healthcare, which absorb a
significant fraction of STEM graduates.
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analysts rather than as computer software developers. To illustrate, Table 7 re-
ports detailed information on the distribution of occupations and degree types in
the finance sector averaged between 2009 and 2014. Clearly, there is mismatch
as the share of STEM graduates working in core STEM occupations is only
39%. This mismatch is offset by the large share of STEM graduates working
either in typical financial occupations or in other job positions. More than 2/3
of financial and STEM occupations are taken by graduate workers, and one out
of ten financial jobs and one out of two for STEM jobs is held by STEM gradu-
ates. When decomposing these figures by degree field, we observe that although
nearly all STEM jobs in finance are core STEM jobs, core STEM graduates
(i.e., graduates in physics, math and computer science) do not constitute the
whole population of STEM graduates working in finance. Specifically, computer
and information science is the main STEM field of study for core STEM jobs
in finance, while non-STEM jobs (financial or other jobs) have large shares of
graduates in engineering, physics and, especially for financial jobs, mathematics
and statistics.
[Table 7 about here]
4.2 Trends in the allocation of STEM graduates
Although depicting any trends in the short time frame between 2009 and 2014
may be difficult, Figure 5 reveals the emergence of some clear patterns. The hir-
ing of STEM graduates (top-left and bottom-left) and of STEM postgraduates
(top-right panel) are upwardly trended for the financial sector but shrinking for
HT and stagnating for KIBS. Particularly striking is that the financial sector’s
ability to attract STEM talents has barely been damaged by the great financial
crisis and the subsequent re-regulation of several financial activities.
[Figure 5 about here]
In the financial sector, the share of STEM graduates grew faster than the
share of STEM jobs (also see panel B of Table 8). This finding can reflect
either the hiring of STEM graduates in typical financial jobs, such as financial
examiners, quantitative analysts or even CEOs (see Table 2 for the definition
of typical financial jobs). In Figure 6, we address this issue by contrasting the
evolution of STEM graduates in typical financial jobs (a measure of how the
STEM input changed in typical financial jobs) with that of college graduates (in
general), STEM graduates and graduates in business-related disciplines across
the entire financial sector. The figure clearly indicates that the share of STEM
graduates in typical financial jobs grew as fast as the share of STEM graduates
in the financial sector as a whole. Moreover, the evolution of the two measures,
both for the whole financial sector and for a typical financial job, outpaced that
of college graduates and of graduates in business-related disciplines.
[Figure 6 about here]
In sum, our descriptive evidence based on information on STEM graduates
rather than STEM workers as measure of STEM input is consistent with the
picture that emerged from the analysis made over the period 1980-2014. The
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financial sector employed an increasing share of STEM graduates both in tra-
ditional STEM jobs and in typical financial jobs. The natural question is then
whether STEM graduates are paid more in the financial sector and in finance
jobs than in the rest of the economy and thus if finance is able to attract the
most talented STEM graduates.
4.3 Wage differentials across sectors and jobs
Figure 7 gives an impressionistic picture of the unconditional wage differences
for STEM graduates (left panel) and postgraduates (right panel) working in
five alternative positions ranked from the highest to the lowest hourly wage:
1. financial jobs (highest), 2. STEM jobs in finance, 3. STEM jobs in HT, 4.
STEM jobs in KIBS, 5. STEM jobs in the rest of the economy (lowest). In the
left panel, we observe that after a modest decline at the beginning of our series,
the divergence between the hourly wage of STEM graduates in financial jobs and
the hourly wage of STEM graduates in STEM jobs began to widen again. The
unconditional hourly wage premium for a STEM graduate working in a financial
job is large not only compared to STEM jobs in other sectors (approximately
40% in 2014) but also compared to STEM jobs in high-tech manufacturing
(about 24% in 2014). As evident from the right panel, this ‘finance’ premium
becomes even larger for STEM postgraduates: the unconditional wage of a
STEM postgraduate choosing a career in a typical financial job is expected to
be 30% higher than that of a STEM postgraduate choosing a career in an HT
STEM job. Note that the premium documented here is likely to be a lower
bound of the actual wage premium of STEM graduates in finance. In fact,
equity-based, cash and deferred bonuses, which are not included in our measure
of hourly wage, constitute a much larger fraction of total earnings in finance
than in other sectors (Lemieux et al., 2009; Bell and van Reenen, 2014).
[Figure 7 about here]
These large wage premiums for STEM graduates working in financial jobs
could merely reflect differences in other characteristics of STEM workers em-
ployed in finance rather than rents or returns to STEM skills. To account for
these differences, we estimate on a yearly basis variants of the following equation
for individual j working in one of the key industries as defined above:
log(wj) = βSTEM Dj + γFIN Oj +
+ ηSTEM Dj × FIN Oj +X ′jθ + εj . (3)
Xj is a vector of standard controls in wage equations
16 and εj is the idiosyncratic
error term. The main variable of interest is the interaction between a dummy
variable that is equal to one for those with a STEM degree STEM Dj and a
dummy variable for those in a typical finance job FIN Oj . Because we allow
STEM Dj and FIN Oj to have an independent effect on wages, our variable of
interest should be interpreted as the wage premium of STEM graduates when
16We include two-digit NAICS sector dummy variables, two-digit SOC occupation dummy
variables, age and its square, a dummy variable for those living in a metropolitan area and
dummy variables for male, married, foreign born, black, other ethnic group than white, some
college, college graduates and postgraduates.
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employed in a typical financial job compared to the average STEM graduate
(and conditional on the worker’s general educational attainment, broad occu-
pational dummy variables and other characteristics). We also want to evaluate
whether STEM graduates earn a higher or lower wage depending on the sector
(rather than the occupation) where they work. To this end, we estimate the
following equation:
log(wj) = βSTEM Dj + γFIN Ij +
+ ηSTEM Dj × FIN Ij +X ′θ + εj , (4)
where FIN Ij is a dummy variable for individuals working in the finance sector
(which is however absorbed by 2-digit NAICS sector dummy variables included
in the vector X). Our coefficient of interest is that of the interaction between
this dummy variable and the STEM graduate dummy variable. To be consistent
with the rest of the analysis, both equations are estimated for the key sectors
only and using person weights.
[Table 9 about here]
Table 9 reports the main results, with panel A focusing on the wage pre-
mium of STEM graduates in financial jobs (equation 3) and panel B focusing
on the wage premium of STEM graduates in the finance sector (equation 4).
Across the board, we detect significant and slowly increasing wage premiums
of approximately 8 percent for STEM graduates that should be added to the
estimated but unreported graduate wage premium. Turning to our variable of
interest, we find that the additional wage premium for STEM graduates work-
ing in typical financial jobs remains statistically significant when we control for
a rich set of worker characteristics. Although this bonus is strongly declining
over time, possibly reflecting the effect of the Great Recession, it is still consid-
erable, corresponding to an additional hourly wage of 2.9 percent in 2014; that
is, a wage premium that is 30% higher than the basic STEM graduate premium.
Note that this premium is also large compared to what a typical financial worker
can make holding everything else constant. In 2014, the additional premium for
a STEM graduate working in a typical financial job is more than 25% higher
than the average wage premium for this kind of job.
When considering the industry-specific dimensions of the STEM wage pre-
mium (panel B), we observe that STEM graduates are paid significantly more
in the financial sector compared to other sectors. Again, this premium is sig-
nificantly lower in 2014 than at the end of the Great Recession but remains
statistically different from zero. Overall, we observe that the significant and
large conditional wage premium for STEM graduates working in the financial
sector has both a sectoral and an occupation-specific component.
[Figure 8 about here]
In addition to the average wage premiums, we also investigate whether
STEM graduates obtain a differential wage premium at different quantiles of
the wage distribution by means of quantile regression. This exercise is useful
for discriminating between the wage premium of highly talented versus normally
talented STEM graduates as ranked by their position in the wage distribution.
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In Figure 8, we plot for each decile of the wage distribution i. the average wage
premium of STEM graduates; ii. the wage premium for STEM graduates em-
ployed in typical financial occupations; and iii. the wage premium for STEM
graduates employed in finance industries. To gauge trends at various points of
the distribution, we estimate these premiums separately for years 2009 (panel A)
and 2014 (panel B). The main message is that the wage premium of a STEM
graduate working in a typical financial job is uniformly increasing along the
wage distribution. This finding contrasts with the flat profile of the premium of
STEM graduates employed elsewhere.
Looking at the changes over time, the STEM wage premium for those work-
ing in the financial sector becomes much flatter than that of those working in
a typical financial job and closely resembles that of STEM graduates employed
elsewhere. While the steepness of the STEM premium in a typical finance job
also decreased considerably in 2014 as compared to 200917, in the 9th decile,
this premium remains two times larger than that for STEM graduates employed
elsewhere. The occupation component of the STEM wage premium in finance
appears to be far more important than the sectoral component at the top of the
wage distribution. This enriches previous analyses of the finance wage premium
that focus on the sectoral dimension only Philippon and Reshef (2012).
The lesson we can draw from this section is that the wages of STEM grad-
uates are significantly higher in the financial sector and in typical financial
jobs whether we control for observable individual characteristics or not. Unless
STEM graduates do not have strong preferences for working on path-breaking
scientific discoveries to solve real problems, our estimated wage premiums sug-
gest that finance is able to attract the best STEM graduates and, as our quantile
estimates indicate, that the brightest among them likely work in typical financial
jobs. The next step is to make a preliminary effort to investigate the possible
consequences of this reallocation of STEM talent for the real economy.
5 Productivity and STEM talents
This section provides empirical evidence on the long-term impact of the reallo-
cation of STEM workers into the financial sector on the performance of the real
(non-financial) economy. Following previous studies (e.g. Barth et al., 2016)
that documented the key role of STEM graduates as drivers of technological
progress and productivity growth, our measure of performance is the long-term
change in labor productivity.
We focus on both the whole US economy and the manufacturing sector alone.
This focus is consistent with the fact that manufacturing has experienced a
decline in the capacity to attract STEM workers that may be partially explained
by the poaching of STEMs by finance.
5.1 Data
Data on capital stock, output and labor productivity (output per worker in con-
stant prices) at the industry level for the whole economy were retrieved from
the “Multifactor Productivity Measures for Major Sectors and Manufacturing”
17To illustrate, while the the difference between the 9th and the first decile was 19.1% in
2009, this difference shrinks to 11.1% in 2014.
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of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). These data cover the private busi-
ness sector for the period 1987-2014 with a breakdown of 59 NAICS industries
(see Table B1 in the Appendix B). For the analysis on the manufacturing sector
alone, we employ the NBER-CES ‘Manufacturing Industry Database’ 18. The
main advantage is that the NBER-CES database has a breakdown of 63 manu-
facturing sectors (see Table B4), while in the BEA database, the breakdown for
manufacturing comprises only 18 sectors. Moreover, the NBER database allows
us to compute productivity measures starting from 1980, i.e., the beginning of
the financial sector deregulation to which Philippon and Reshef (2012) ascribe
the bulk of changes in wages and human capital examined here. As a result, our
analysis of the whole real economy covers the timespan 1990-2014 split in three
sub-periods (1990-2000, 2000-2007 and 2007-2014), while our analysis on the
manufacturing sector covers the timespan 1980-2007 split in three sub-periods
(1980-1990, 1990-2000 and 2000-2007).
For each year, proxies of STEM input by industry are calculated as usual: the
sectoral average of the STEM measure (e.g., core STEM jobs and math inten-
sity) weighted by sampling weights multiplied by the average hours worked. To
match the industrial classification of the harmonized Census and ACS (ind1990 )
with the NAICS classification of the BEA and NBER-CES database, we exploit
the fact that from 2000 onward, the industry of each employee in the ACS is
double coded in both ind1990 and NAICS. We instead use a weighted crosswalk
to match ind1990 and NAICS for the decennial censuses (1980, 1990, 2000), in-
ferring weights from ACS data in 2000.19
5.2 Estimation framework
Our starting point is a standard production function framework augmented for
human capital (e.g. Mankiw et al., 1992). The general estimation equation is:
log(yi,t) = ψlog(k
s
i,t) + φlog(k
e
i,t) +
+ ηlog(lit) + θtRTIi,0 + βSTEMit + µt + εi,t, (5)
where log(y)i,t is the log of the output (in constant price) per worker in sector i at
time t, log(ksi,t) is the log of the capital stock in structures per worker, log(k
e
i,t)
is the log of the capital stock in equipment per worker, log(lit) is the log of
employment to allow for the possibility of increasing or decreasing returns to
scale, RTIi,0 is the initial routine task intensity index measured in the first year
18See, http://www.nber.org/nberces/.
19The NAICS code of workers in IPUMS data is available only in the ACS (2000-2014) data
(283 industries in the private sector) while an harmonized industry classification (ind1990,
with 163 industries in the private sector) is available both in ACS and in the decennial censuses.
To harmonize information about industry-level STEM input for the years in which we use the
decennial censuses (1990 and 2000) to match the BEA-NAICS and NBER-NAICS aggregations
we build a weighted crosswalk between ind1990 and the detailed NAICS codes using individual
data in ACS that are coded both with ind1990 and NAICS. The average weights (based on
year 2000) for the crosswalk are based on sampling weights multiplied by the average number
of hours worked per individual. Out of 196 (70) ind1990 industries, as many as 177 (62)
can be matched one-to-one to the corresponding BEA-NAICS (NBER-NAICS) industry. The
exact ind1990 -NAICS crosswalks for BEA and NBER classifications are reported in Tables
B2 and B5 in the Appendix B, while the weighted ind1990 -NAICS crosswalks are reported in
Tables B3 and B6 in the Appendix B, respectively.
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and interacted with time dummy variables to flexibly account for the exposure
of the labor force to automation, µt are time effects and εi,t is the idiosyncratic
error term.20
This production function framework is extended to account for the role
played by human capital in productivity growth and to evaluate how the re-
allocation of STEM talents to finance contributes to productivity growth in
other sectors but finance. The key variable here is STEMit, which is the share
of workers employed in core STEM occupations in sector i and year t. Consis-
tent with the descriptive evidence above, we consider all core STEM workers as
well as core STEM workers with a college degree.
We estimate equation 5 in first-difference form for all variables as we are
interested in the effect of STEMit input on productivity growth. Because there
is no consensus on whether the stock or flow of human capital input affects
productivity dynamics (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994), we estimate an alternative
specification where the STEM input is the average value between start and end
period. In both specifications, we also include the pre-sample mean of output
per capita (in log) to account for different productivity dynamics depending on
initial conditions. Finally, sectors are weighted by initial hours worked in the
industry. Finance sectors (see Table B1) are excluded from the analysis.
Our simple strategy to account for the effect of STEM reallocation into fi-
nance on productivity in the rest of the economy consists of simulating a coun-
terfactual productivity growth in the absence of such reallocation. In practice,
we assume that the share of STEM workers in finance remained fixed at the
initial level. We then reallocate the exceeding STEM workers from finance to
non-finance industries proportional to the ratios of STEM workers relative to
the whole economy at the beginning of each period. For instance, if an HT
industry employed 3% of all STEM workers in 1990, it will receive 3% of the
difference in the number of STEM workers in finance between 1990 and 1980.
The counterfactual productivity is computed using the estimated contribution
of STEM workers to productivity (βˆ).
A caveat is required at this point. Our counterfactual measure is not ob-
tained through a structural equation model and thus does not provide a precise
account of the global welfare losses and gains in the absence of such a realloca-
tion. Moreover, our exercise can be best seen as a preliminary way to isolate
a particular channel through which the absorption of STEM into finance can
affect the real economy. The next section illustrates the main result of this
preliminary exercise and discusses in greater detail the source of bias in our
estimates.
5.3 Results and discussion
The results of the estimates of equation 5 reported in Appendix C and in Ta-
bles C1 and C2 suggest statistically significant and large contribution of STEM
workers to labor productivity in all specifications, as expected. This finding
means that the documented shift of STEM talent to the finance sector had the
effect of reducing labor productivity in the real economy and thus can be labeled
as a “misallocation”.
20When considering the whole real economy, we also allow for specific time dummy variables
in the manufacturing sectors.
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[Tables 10 and 11 about here]
To frame our simulated counterfactual, the cumulative labor productivity
growth in the whole real economy over the period 1990-2014 was 34.35 per-
cent, while the cumulative labor productivity growth in manufacturing over the
period 1980-2007 was 135.42 percent. If we assumed that the share of STEM
workers in finance remained fixed at the initial level (1990 for the whole real
economy, 1980 for manufacturing) and the excess of STEM workers were reallo-
cated proportionally to non-finance sectors, we would have observed a relative
increase in the share of STEM workers of 6.6 percent and 9.84 percent for the
whole real economy and the manufacturing sector, respectively (9.46 percent
and 12.44 percent if we consider STEM workers with a college degree). This as-
sumption means that we simulate that about 261 thousand STEM workers who
were actually employed in finance in 2014 were reallocated back to non-finance
sectors.
When considering the whole real economy, we estimate a very modest gap
between the actual cumulative productivity growth and the simulated counter-
factual growth with no misallocation. Depending on the specification chosen,
the cumulative growth of productivity would have been 0.31 to 0.98 percent
higher in the absence of the STEM reallocation to finance. The impact is
only slightly larger when considering STEM workers with a college degree (be-
tween 0.33 percent and 1.14 percent). However, the gap becomes economically
meaningful for the manufacturing sectors alone for the period 1980-2007. The
cumulative gains in output per capita are now in the range of 6.6 to 7.8 percent,
again with no notable differences between STEMs and graduate STEMs. These
results are fully consistent with the fact that the decline of STEM input has
been mostly concentrated in manufacturing. Note also that these impacts are
larger in high-tech sectors that employ a larger share of STEM workers. The
cumulative gains in the absence of the reallocation of STEM workers to finance
for high-tech manufacturing sectors would have been between 9.71 and 12.39
percent (between 8.21 and 9.62 percent when considering STEM workers with a
college degree). Given the substantial technological spillovers of these high-tech
sectors on the rest of the economy (Lockwood et al., 2017), these estimated
effects are likely to be a lower bound of the true misallocation effect.
Other sources of bias can affect our counterfactual estimate of the misal-
location effect. First, there is no doubt that financial development is a key
driver of growth and prosperity (Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Levine, 2005). An
increase in the efficiency of finance can have positive repercussions on the real
economy, and this is what may have occurred thanks to a more intensive use
of mathematical and statistical inputs. The limited variation of our data does
not allow for the identification of such spillovers that would work against our
conclusion that there has been a misallocation of STEM into finance. However,
anecdotal evidence suggests that STEM graduates are employed in tasks such
as algorithmic trading that have little direct impact on the real economy. Put
differently, it seems quite unlikely that STEM inputs have been used to improve
the channels through which finance can positively affect the real economy, such
as the production of information about investment opportunities, monitoring
firms or the provision of credit to innovative firms.
Second, we cannot isolate endogenous supply responses driven by the STEM
wage premium in Wall Street jobs. For instance, it may be the case that part
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of the substantial immigration of STEM talents to the US has been driven by
high expected rewards in finance.21 Likewise, we cannot measure the extent
to which the increase in STEM graduates over the past four decades has been
driven by high expected earnings in finance. On the one hand, since both
these endogenous supply responses increase the mass of STEM in the economy,
they should mitigate the misallocation effect. On the other hand, the inflow
of foreign STEM in the US decreases the global capacity to innovate and may
have negative spillovers for the US economy as well.
Third, we cannot measure talent heterogeneity within the STEM group. If,
as is suggested by our analysis of the STEM wage premiums in finance, the most
talented STEM workers end up working in finance (e.g., in high-frequency trad-
ing) rather than in high-tech industries (e.g., discovering new drugs and cleaner
technologies), our estimated effects are definitely a lower bound. To illustrate,
it is well-known in the literature that the distribution of research productivity
is highly skewed, with few inventors accounting for the bulk of valuable innova-
tions (e.g., Narin and Breitzman, 1995). As a result, the consequence of a few
top scientists moving from high-tech manufacturing to finance can be consider-
able in terms of productivity growth. This issue relates to the recent debate on
declining research productivity (Bloom et al., 2017), questioning the extent to
which the poaching of the best STEM graduates by finance has contributed to
reducing scientific productivity in the US economy.
Overall, the sources of bias tend to offset each other and may even be fa-
vorable to our conclusions. We can hence conclude that the reallocation of core
STEM talents into finance has been de facto a misallocation given its negative
consequences for productivity in the real economy, especially so in the manu-
facturing sector.
6 Concluding remarks
We document the remarkable change in the sectoral allocation of STEM tal-
ents in the US economy over the past four decades. The salient feature is an
impressive inflow of STEM workers and graduates into finance at the expense
of high-tech manufacturing sectors. The general skill upgrading in finance has
been strongly biased towards STEM skills. The large wage premium paid to
STEM graduates in the financial sector and even more in typical financial jobs
is compatible with several anecdotes of top scientists going to work in hedge
funds or investment banks. Indeed, not only is this premium large compared to
that received in STEM jobs outside finance but it also is magnified at the top
of the income distribution.
Our study seeks to provide a preliminary answer to the fundamental question
as to the impact of the STEM brain drain into finance on the real economy. We
find that this impact has been modestly large in manufacturing and accounts
for approximately 6.6% of lost cumulative productivity gains over the sample
period. Although our strategy may not be able to identify the size of the effect
precisely, we still believe that we are at least depicting a strong correlation
between the STEM inflow towards finance and productivity growth in the real
21There is a active literature on the increasing importance of STEM immigrants in the US
economy. See, e.g, Hanson et al. (2016) and Jaimovich and Siu (2016).
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economy. With this caveat in mind, we can draw some policy implications from
these results.
First and foremost, our results indicate that focusing on STEM education
to reignite sluggish productivity growth may not suffice in the presence of dis-
tortions that prevent the first-best allocation of STEM talent to sectors and
jobs. Given the extremely high education cost of an engineer compared to other
graduates (Altonji and Zimmerman, 2017), the US economy cannot afford to
waste the brightest STEM talents on unproductive rent-seeking uses. Regula-
tion can help solve the allocation problem by reducing the negative externality
generated by a pure market allocation of talents. The first-best option would be
a sort of Pigouvian tax equivalent to the marginal damage (in terms of forgone
productivity improvements) created by a STEM graduate employed in finance.
However, it may be extremely difficult to precisely estimate the size of this
negative externality.
An alternative measure would be to enforce more serious limits on the range
of activities that can be performed by the financial sector, up to the point of
banning STEM-intensive activities such as high-frequency trading altogether.
Clearly, the recent regulation of the financial sector (i.e., the Dodd-Frank Act)
has not been sufficient to restore a more efficient allocation of STEM talents
toward productive uses. A more ambitious approach is thus required but will
hardly be pursued by the new US administration. Either way, a much-needed
political priority is to carry out a detailed evaluation of the net social value
created by certain financial activities where STEM graduates are intensively
employed.
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Tables and figures
Table 1: Definition of STEM degrees (for ACS 2009-2014)
Computer related degrees: Science degrees:
Computer Engineering Physical Sciences
Mathematics and Computer Science Astronomy and Astrophysics
Communication Technologies Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology
Computer and Information Systems Chemistry
Computer Programming and Data Processing Geology and Earth Science
Computer Science Geosciences
Information Sciences Oceanography
Computer Information Management Physics
Computer Networking and Telecommunication Materials Science
Multi-disciplinary or General Science
Math degrees: Neuroscience
Mathematics Cognitive Science and Biopsychology
Applied Mathematics Biology
Statistics and Decision Science Biochemical Sciences
Botany
Engineering degrees: Molecular Biology
All engineering degrees Genetics
Microbiology
Pharmacology
Physiology
Zoology
Neuroscience
Miscellaneous Biology
Table 2: Definition of STEM and Finance occupations (based on the occ1990
classification in IPUMS)
Core STEM occupations Non-core STEM occupations High-skill financial occupations
Computer systems analysts and computer scientists Aerospace engineer Chief executives and public administrators
Operations and systems researchers and analysts Metallurgical and materials engineers Financial managers
Actuaries Petroleum, mining, and geological engineers Accountants and auditors
Statisticians Chemical engineers Insurance underwriters
Mathematicians and mathematical scientists Civil engineers Other financial specialists
Physicists and astronomers Electrical engineer Actuaries
Atmospheric and space scientists Industrial engineers
Physical scientists, n.e.c. Mechanical engineers
Computer software developers Not-elsewhere-classified engineers
Chemists
Geologists
Agricultural and food scientists
Biological scientists
Foresters and conservation scientists
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Figure 1: Evolution of STEM jobs and other skill measures: finance vs. selected
sectors, 1980-2014
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Figure 2: Evolution of DOT task measures: finance vs. selected sectors, 1980-
2014
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Table 3: Definition of key industries (based on the ind1990 classification in
IPUMS)
Finance: Medium-low tech manufacturing:
Banking Meat products
Savings institutions, including credit Dairy products
Credit agencies, n.e.c. Canned, frozen, and preserved fruits and vegetables
Security, commodity brokerage, and investments companies Grain mill products
Insurance Bakery products
Sugar and confectionery products
KIBS: Beverage industries
Computer and data processing services Misc. food preparations and kindred products
Engineering, architectural, and surveying services Food industries, n.s.
Research, development, and testing services Tobacco manufactures
Knitting mills
Health: Dyeing and finishing textiles, except wool and knit goods
Offices and clinics of physicians Carpets and rugs
Offices and clinics of dentists Yarn, thread, and fabric mills
Offices and clinics of chiropractors Apparel and accessories, except knit
Offices and clinics of optometrists Miscellaneous fabricated textile products
Hospitals Pulp, paper, and paperboard mills
Nursing and personal care facilities Miscellaneous paper and pulp products
Health services, n.e.c. Paperboard containers and boxes
Newspaper publishing and printing
Education: Printing, publishing, and allied indust
Elementary and secondary schools Plastics, synthetics, and resins
Colleges and universities Soaps and cosmetics
Paints, varnishes, and related products
Utilities: Agricultural chemicals
Gas and steam supply systems Industrial and miscellaneous chemicals
Electric and gas, and other combination Petroleum refining
Water supply and irrigation Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products
Tires and inner tubes
Mining and quarrying: Other rubber products, and plastics footwear and belting
Coal mining Miscellaneous plastics products
Oil and gas extraction Footwear, except rubber and plastic
Leather products, except footwear
High-tech manufacturing: Logging
Drugs Sawmills, planing mills, and millwork
Computers and related equipment Wood buildings and mobile homes
Machinery, except electrical, n.e.c. Furniture and fixtures
Machinery, n.s. Glass and glass products
Household appliances Cement, concrete, gypsum, and plaster products
Radio, TV, and communication equipment Structural clay products
Motor vehicles and motor vehicle equipment Pottery and related products
Aircraft and parts Misc. nonmetallic mineral and stone products
Ship and boat building and repairing Blast furnaces, steelworks, rolling and finishing mills
Railroad locomotives and equipment Iron and steel foundries
Guided missiles, space vehicles, and parts Primary aluminum industries
Cycles and miscellaneous transportation Other primary metal industries
Scientific and controlling instruments Cutlery, handtools, and general hardware
Medical, dental, and optical instruments and supplies Fabricated structural metal products
Metal forgings and stampings
Ordnance
Miscellaneous fabricated metal products
Metal industries, n.s.
Engines and turbines
Farm machinery and equipment
Construction and material handling machines
Metalworking machinery
Toys, amusement, and sporting goods
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
Manufacturing industries, n.s.
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Table 4: Allocation of STEM workers across industries: 1980-2014
Distribution of STEM jobs across sectors
(share of total STEM jobs)
1980 2014
Finance 0.0377 0.0801
KIBS 0.1588 0.3120
High-Tech Manuf. 0.2830 0.1652
Low-Tech Manuf. 0.1775 0.0736
Oil 0.0278 0.0131
Utilities 0.0127 0.0068
Health 0.0199 0.0384
Education 0.0452 0.0478
Other Industries 0.2374 0.2631
Distribution of core STEM jobs across
sectors (share of total core STEM jobs)
1980 2014
Finance 0.0965 0.1150
KIBS 0.1805 0.3396
High-Tech Manuf. 0.1998 0.0847
Low-Tech Manuf. 0.1194 0.0447
Oil 0.0115 0.0042
Utilities 0.0110 0.0042
Health 0.0326 0.0508
Education 0.0949 0.0638
Other Industries 0.2538 0.2930
Table 5: STEM intensity by industry, 1980 and 2014
Share of STEM jobs over total employment
in the industry
1980 2014
Finance 0.0211 0.0699
KIBS 0.2998 0.4209
High-Tech Manuf. 0.0923 0.1585
Low-Tech Manuf. 0.0281 0.0450
Oil 0.0755 0.0768
Utilities 0.0572 0.0744
Health 0.0073 0.0160
Education 0.0175 0.0255
Other Industries 0.0134 0.0222
Share of core STEM jobs over total
employment in the industry
1980 2014
Finance 0.0192 0.0680
KIBS 0.1210 0.3104
High-Tech Manuf. 0.0231 0.0551
Low-Tech Manuf. 0.0067 0.0185
Oil 0.0111 0.0165
Utilities 0.0176 0.0313
Health 0.0043 0.0143
Education 0.0130 0.0231
Other Industries 0.0051 0.0167
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Figure 3: Relative comparison: finance vs. high-tech manufacturing
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Figure 4: Relative comparison: finance vs. KIBS
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Table 6: Conditional differences in STEM skill growth - key sectors only
1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2007 2007-2014
Panel A - 4 share workers in core STEM occupations
Finance 0.00717** 0.00274* 0.00372 0.00901***
(0.00318) (0.00156) (0.00551) (0.00317)
R-squared 0.742 0.861 0.0966 0.191
Panel B - 4 share graduate workers in core STEM occupations
Finance 0.00300* -0.00809* 0.00620 0.00981***
(0.00164) (0.00442) (0.00586) (0.00248)
R-squared 0.890 0.832 0.853 0.410
Panel C - 4 share postgraduate workers in core STEM occupations
Finance 0.000178 -0.00393 0.00350 0.00421***
(0.000673) (0.00276) (0.00311) (0.00104)
R-squared 0.0618 0.807 0.679 0.631
Panel D - 4 average Math task intensity
Finance 0.00432 0.00158 0.0132*** 0.00667
(0.00608) (0.00780) (0.00307) (0.00592)
R-squared 0.220 0.195 0.242 0.0518
Panel E - 4 share postgraduate workers
Finance -0.00159 -0.0227*** -0.0140*** 0.00770
(0.00645) (0.00618) (0.00484) (0.00779)
R-squared 0.562 0.358 0.456 0.355
N=97. Regressions weighted by average hours worked in industry. Only
key industries included: KIBS, manufacturing, education, health, oil, util-
ities, finance. Controls not shown: log years of school, log age, RTI index,
lagged STEM. Robust std errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Table 7: Overlap of STEM and Finance occupations with STEM degrees in
finance (average 2009-2014)
Core
STEM oc-
cupations
Financial
occupa-
tions
Other oc-
cupations
Total
Distribution of employment in finance sector 0.0686 0.2700 0.6614 -
Distribution of total STEM degrees in finance 0.3903 0.2761 0.3336 -
Share with a college degree 0.7031 0.6487 0.3894 0.4825
Share of graduates with STEM degrees 0.5514 0.1036 0.0937 0.1413
Composition of STEM degrees:
Computer and Information Sciences 0.4875 0.1788 0.2410 0.3260
Engineering 0.2693 0.3788 0.3569 0.3388
Mathematics and Statistics 0.1506 0.2564 0.1761 0.1691
Physical Sciences 0.0615 0.1459 0.1647 0.1213
Engineering Technologies 0.0291 0.0346 0.0528 0.0397
Biology and Life Sciences 0.0020 0.0056 0.0085 0.0052
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Table 8: STEM intensity by industry, 2009-2014
Panel A - STEM intensity in 2009
STEM
degree
STEM
degree
(postgrad)
Core STEM
degree
STEM occ Core STEM
occ
Finance 0.0671 0.0260 0.0473 0.0727 0.0711
KIBS 0.3254 0.1327 0.1864 0.4708 0.3286
High-Tech Manuf. 0.1833 0.0752 0.0869 0.2043 0.0672
Low-Tech Manuf. 0.0552 0.0158 0.0161 0.0645 0.0159
Oil 0.0918 0.0330 0.0178 0.0894 0.0195
Utilities 0.0839 0.0221 0.0263 0.0900 0.0334
Health 0.0299 0.0196 0.0112 0.0207 0.0151
Education 0.0606 0.0390 0.0369 0.0307 0.0242
Other Industries 0.0336 0.0107 0.0162 0.0264 0.0165
Total 0.0562 0.0227 0.0286 0.0547 0.0331
Panel B - Change in STEM intensity 2009-2014
STEM
degree
STEM
degree
(postgrad)
Core STEM
degree
STEM occ Core STEM
occ
Finance 0.0119 0.0061 0.0052 0.0097 0.0091
KIBS 0.0136 0.0039 0.0101 0.0107 0.0286
High-Tech Manuf. -0.0027 0.0005 -0.0088 -0.0054 -0.0047
Low-Tech Manuf. 0.0044 0.0023 0.0016 0.0047 0.0015
Oil 0.0006 -0.0014 -0.0011 0.0057 -0.0003
Utilities 0.0133 0.0135 0.0021 -0.0010 0.0024
Health 0.0123 0.0071 0.0025 0.0018 0.0016
Education 0.0098 0.0053 0.0017 0.0019 0.0025
Other Industries 0.0061 0.0022 0.0029 0.0028 0.0028
Total 0.0079 0.0036 0.0028 0.0040 0.0041
Figure 5: Evolution of STEM degrees in selected sectors, 2009-2014
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Figure 6: Trend in various skill measures in the financial sector, 2009-2014
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Figure 7: Trend in average hourly wage (current US$) of STEM graduates in
selected sectors, 2009-2014
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Table 9: Wage premium of STEM degrees
Panel A - Wage premium of STEM graduates in finance jobs
Dep var: log(hourly wage) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
STEM degree 0.0829*** 0.0721*** 0.0875*** 0.0949*** 0.102*** 0.0987***
(0.00355) (0.00363) (0.00366) (0.00358) (0.00354) (0.00354)
Finance occupation 0.0847*** 0.0740*** 0.0898*** 0.0998*** 0.110*** 0.111***
(0.00473) (0.00473) (0.00493) (0.00480) (0.00483) (0.00485)
STEM degree x Finance occupation 0.0969*** 0.0624*** 0.0559*** 0.0529*** 0.0225 0.0286**
(0.0146) (0.0148) (0.0153) (0.0144) (0.0148) (0.0144)
R-squared 0.416 0.411 0.416 0.421 0.417 0.418
Observations 623585 611660 606538 613418 629787 627617
Panel B - Wage premium of STEM graduates in finance sector
Dep var: log(hourly wage) 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
STEM degree 0.0771*** 0.0700*** 0.0872*** 0.0888*** 0.0999*** 0.0949***
(0.00418) (0.00416) (0.00460) (0.00439) (0.00435) (0.00428)
STEM degree x Finance sector 0.0827*** 0.0435*** 0.0306** 0.0302** 0.0247* 0.0307**
(0.0123) (0.0122) (0.0140) (0.0125) (0.0128) (0.0122)
R-squared 0.384 0.379 0.384 0.386 0.386 0.388
Observations 623585 611660 606538 613418 629787 627617
OLS estimates on ACS-IPUMS microdata weighted by person weights. Sample: workers employed in key industries. Control
variables: SOC 2-digit occupation dummy variables, NAICS 2-digit industry dummy variables, age (linear and squared),
metro-area dummy variable, sex dummy variable, married dummmy, black dummy variable, non-white dummy variable,
foreign born dummy variable, some college dummy variable, college degree dummy variable, postgraduate dummy. Robust
standard in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Figure 8: Wage premium of STEM degrees by decile of wage
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Results based on quantile regression estimates on ACS-IPUMS microdata weighted by person weights. Sample: workers
employed in key industries. Control variables: SOC 2-digit occupation dummy variables, finance occupation dummy variable,
NAICS 2-digit industry dummy variables, age (linear and squared), metro-area dummy variable, sex dummy variable, married
dummmy, black dummy variable, non-white dummy variable, foreign born dummy variable, some college dummy variable,
college degree dummy variable, postgraduate dummy.
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Table 10: Predicted increase in productivity in the real economy assuming fixed
(first year) STEM input in the finance industry - All non-finance and non-
agricultural private sector (data from BEA)
Core STEM occ Graduate core
STEM occ
Actual cumulative labor productivity growth 1990-2014 0.3697
Relative predicted increase in STEM input with constant
STEM input in finance (1990-2014) 0.0660 0.0946
First difference estimation
Simulated labor productivity growth 1990-2014 0.3795 0.3810
Difference with respect to actual growth 0.0098 0.0114
First difference estimation (with average STEM input in t, t-1)
Simulated labor productivity growth 1990-2014 0.3728 0.3730
Difference with respect to actual growth 0.0031 0.0033
The estimated contribution of STEM workers to labor productivity is derived from Table C1. To compute
simulated growth, we assume that the share of STEM workers in finance remained fixed at its initial level
and that all exceeding STEM workers were attributed to non-finance industries according to their year-
specific number of actual STEM workers.
Table 11: Predicted increase in productivity in the real economy assuming fixed
(first year) STEM input in the finance industry - Detailed manufacturing in-
dustries (data from NBER)
Core STEM occ Graduate core
STEM occ
Actual cumulative labor productivity growth 1980-2007 1.6526
Relative predicted increase in STEM input with constant
STEM input in finance (1980-2007) 0.0984 0.1244
First difference estimation
Simulated labor productivity growth 1980-2007 1.7187 1.7072
Difference with respect to actual growth 0.0661 0.0545
First difference estimation (with average STEM input in t, t-1)
Simulated labor productivity growth 1980-2007 1.7324 1.7144
Difference with respect to actual growth 0.0797 0.0617
The estimated contribution of STEM workers to labor productivity is derived from Table C2. To computed
simulated growth, we assume that the share of STEM workers in finance remained fixed at its initial level
and that all exceeding STEM workers were attributed to non-finance industries according to their year-
specific number of actual STEM workers.
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A Conditional differences in STEM skill growth
- additional results
Table A1: Conditional differences in STEM skill growth - Focus on investment
banking
1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2007 2007-2014
Panel A - 4 share workers in core STEM occupations
Investment banking 0.0215*** 0.00695*** 0.0158** 0.000367
(0.00368) (0.00254) (0.00639) (0.00355)
R-squared 0.767 0.861 0.174 0.103
Panel B - 4 share graduate workers in core STEM occupations
Investment banking 0.0141*** -0.0126 0.0198*** 0.00445
(0.000937) (0.00858) (0.00665) (0.00285)
R-squared 0.906 0.836 0.880 0.339
Panel C - 4 share postgraduate workers in core STEM occupations
Investment banking 0.00428*** -0.00812 0.00602 0.00423**
(0.000326) (0.00549) (0.00603) (0.00187)
R-squared 0.200 0.810 0.681 0.623
Panel D - 4 average Math task intensity
Investment banking 0.0224*** -0.00882 0.0105** -0.00850
(0.00574) (0.0148) (0.00467) (0.00664)
R-squared 0.234 0.165 0.127 0.0340
Panel E - 4 share postgraduate workers
Investment banking 0.0116 -0.0154 -0.0110** -0.00466
(0.00792) (0.0115) (0.00554) (0.00817)
R-squared 0.563 0.380 0.469 0.312
N=93. Regressions weighted by average hours worked in industry. Only
key industries included: KIBS, manufacturing, education, health, oil, util-
ities, investment banking. Finance industries different from investment
banking were excluded. Controls not shown: log years of school, log age,
RTI index, lagged STEM. Robust std errors. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, ***
p<0.01.
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B Details on sectoral cross-walks
Table B1: Sectoral aggregation of BEA data (based on NAICS)
NAICS Description
Real economy
211 Oil and Gas Extraction
212 Mining, except Oil and Gas
213 Support Activities for Mining
22 Utilities
23 Construction
311,312 Food and Beverage and Tobacco Products
313,314 Textile Mills and Textile Product Mills
315,316 Apparel and Leather and Applied Products
321 Wood Products
322 Paper Products
323 Printing and Related Support Activities
324 Petroleum and Coal Products
325 Chemical Products
326 Plastics and Rubber Products
327 Nonmetallic Mineral Products
331 Primary Metals
332 Fabricated Metal Products
333 Machinery
334 Computer and Electronic Products
335 Electrical Equipment, Appliances, and Components
336 Transportation Equipment
337 Furniture and Related Products
339 Miscellaneous Manufacturing
42 Wholesale Trade
44,45 Retail Trade
481 Air Transportation
482 Rail Transportation
483 Water Transportation
484 Truck Transportation
485 Transit and Ground Passenger Transportation
486 Pipeline Transportation
487,488,492 Other Transportation and Support Activities
493 Warehousing and Storage
511 Publishing industries, except Internet [includes software]
512 Motion Picture and Sound Recording Industries
515,517 Broadcasting and Telecommunications
518,519 Data processing, Internet publishing, and Other Information Services
531 Real Estate
532,533 Rental and Leasing Services and Lessors of Intangible Assets
5411 Legal Services
5412-5414,5416-5419 Miscellaneous Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services
5415 Computer Systems Design and Related Services
55 Management of Companies and Enterprises
561 Administrative and Support Services
562 Waste Management and Remediation Services
61 Educational Services
621 Ambulatory Health Care Services
622,623 Hospitals and Nursing and Residential Care Facilities
624 Social Assistance
711,712 Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, Museums, and Related Activities
713 Amusements, Gambling, and Recreation Industries
721 Accommodation
722 Food Services and Drinking Places
81 Other Services, except Government
Finance
521,522 Federal Reserve Banks, Credit Intermediation, and Related Activities
523 Securities, Commodity Contracts, and Investments
524 Insurance Carriers and Related Activities
525 Funds, Trusts, and Other Financial Vehicles
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Table B2: Exact crosswalk between ind1990 and NAICS (BEA)
ind1990 NAICS ind1990 NAICS ind1990 NAICS
12 5412-5414,5416-5419 320 333 631 44,45
20 561 322 334 633 44,45
40 212 332 333 641 722
41 212 340 335 642 44,45
50 212 341 334 650 44,45
60 23 351 336 652 44,45
100 311,312 352 336 660 44,45
101 311,312 360 336 662 44,45
102 311,312 361 336 663 44,45
110 311,312 362 336 670 44,45
111 311,312 370 336 671 44,45
112 311,312 371 334 672 44,45
120 311,312 372 339 681 44,45
121 311,312 390 339 682 44,45
122 311,312 391 339 701 521,522
130 311,312 400 482 702 521,522
140 313,314 401 485 711 524
141 313,314 402 485 712 531
150 313,314 411 493 721 5412-5414,5416-5419
151 315,316 420 483 722 561
152 313,314 421 481 731 561
160 322 450 22 740 561
161 322 452 22 751 81
162 322 470 22 752 81
171 511 472 22 760 81
180 325 500 42 761 81
181 325 501 42 762 721
182 325 502 42 770 721
190 325 511 42 771 81
191 325 512 42 772 81
192 325 521 42 780 81
200 324 530 42 781 81
201 324 531 42 800 512
210 326 532 42 802 713
211 326 540 42 812 621
212 326 541 42 820 621
221 315,316 542 42 821 621
222 315,316 550 42 822 621
231 321 551 42 831 622,623
241 321 552 42 832 622,623
242 337 560 42 840 621
250 327 561 42 841 5411
251 327 562 42 842 61
252 327 571 42 850 61
261 327 580 44,45 860 61
262 327 581 44,45 861 624
270 331 582 44,45 862 624
271 331 591 44,45 870 622,623
272 331 600 44,45 871 624
280 331 601 44,45 872 711,712
281 332 610 311,312 880 81
282 332 611 44,45 881 81
291 332 612 44,45 882 5412-5414,5416-5419
292 332 620 44,45 890 5412-5414,5416-5419
300 332 621 44,45 891 5412-5414,5416-5419
310 333 622 44,45 892 5412-5414,5416-5419
311 333 623 44,45 893 711,712
312 333 630 44,45
Table B3: Weighted crosswalk between ind1990 and NAICS (BEA)
ind1990 NAICS Weight ind1990 NAICS Weight
42 213 0.81 651 44,45 0.50
42 211 0.19 710 523 0.87
172 323 0.81 710 525 0.87
172 511 0.19 710 55 0.08
331 333 0.67 732 5415 0.80
331 332 0.33 732 532,533 0.05
342 334 0.67 732 511 0.03
342 335 0.33 741 561 0.54
410 484 0.76 741 5412-5414,5416-5419 0.16
410 487,488,492 0.24 741 532,533 0.06
432 487,488,492 0.72 741 512 0.02
432 561 0.28 741 518,519 0.02
440 515,517 0.45 742 532,533 0.50
440 518,519 0.06 742 81 0.50
441 515,517 0.37 791 81 0.83
441 518,519 0.04 791 5412-5414,5416-5419 0.17
451 22 0.77 810 532,533 0.50
451 486 0.23 810 713 0.50
471 562 0.79 852 518,519 0.49
471 22 0.21
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Table B4: Sectoral aggregation of NBER-CES/IPUMS data (based on NAICS)
NAICS Description
3111,3112 Animal Food Manufacturing; Grain and Oilseed Milling
3113 Sugar and Confectionery Product Manufacturing
3114 Fruit and Vegetable Preserving and Specialty Food Manufacturing
3115 Dairy Product Manufacturing
3116 Animal Slaughtering and Processing
3118 Bakeries and Tortilla Manufacturing
3121 Beverage Manufacturing
3122 Tobacco Manufacturing
3131 Fiber, Yarn, and Thread Mills
3132 Fabric Mills
3133 Textile and Fabric Finishing and Fabric Coating Mills
314 Textile Product Mills
3151 Apparel Knitting Mills
3152 Cut and Sew Apparel Manufacturing
3159 Apparel Accessories and Other Apparel Manufacturing
3161,3169
Leather and Hide Tanning and Finishing; Other Leather and Allied
Product Manufacturing
3162 Footwear Manufacturing
3211 Sawmills and Wood Preservation
3212 Veneer, Plywood, and Engineered Wood Product Manufacturing
3219 Other Wood Product Manufacturing
3221 Pulp, Paper, and Paperboard Mills
3222 Converted Paper Product Manufacturing
3231 Printing and Related Support Activities
3241 Petroleum and Coal Products Manufacturing
3251,3259
Basic Chemical Manufacturing; Other Chemical Product and Preparation
Manufacturing
3252
Resin, Synthetic Rubber, and Artificial Synthetic Fibers and Filaments
Manufacturing
3253 Pesticide, Fertilizer, and Other Agricultural Chemical Manufacturing
3254 Pharmaceutical and Medicine Manufacturing
3255 Paint, Coating, and Adhesive Manufacturing
3256 Soap, Cleaning Compound, and Toilet Preparation Manufacturing
3261 Plastics Product Manufacturing
3262 Rubber Product Manufacturing
3271 Clay Product and Refractory Manufacturing
3272 Glass and Glass Product Manufacturing
3273,3274
Cement and Concrete Product Manufacturing; Lime and Gypsum Product
Manufacturing
3279 Other Nonmetallic Mineral Product Manufacturing
3311,3312
Iron and Steel Mills and Ferroalloy Manufacturing; Steel Product
Manufacturing from Purchased Steel
3313 Alumina and Aluminum Production and Processing
3314 Nonferrous Metal (except Aluminum) Production and Processing
3315 Foundries
3321 Forging and Stamping
3322 Cutlery and Handtool Manufacturing
3323,3324
Architectural and Structural Metals Manufacturing; Boiler, Tank, and
Shipping Container Manufacturing
3327 Machine Shops; Turned Product; and Screw, Nut, and Bolt Manufacturing
3328 Coating, Engraving, Heat Treating, and Allied Activities
3329 Other Fabricated Metal Product Manufacturing
3331 Agriculture, Construction, and Mining Machinery Manufacturing
3332,3334,3339
Industrial Machinery Manufacturing; Ventilation, Heating,
Air-Conditioning, and Commercial Refrigeration Equipment
Manufacturing; Other General Purpose Machinery Manufacturing
3333 Commercial and Service Industry Machinery Manufacturing
3335 Metalworking Machinery Manufacturing
3336 Engine, Turbine, and Power Transmission Equipment Manufacturing
3341 Computer and Peripheral Equipment Manufacturing
3342,3343
Communications Equipment Manufacturing; Audio and Video Equipment
Manufacturing
3345
Navigational, Measuring, Electromedical, and Control Instruments
Manufacturing
3351,3353,3359
Electric Lighting Equipment Manufacturing; Electrical Equipment
Manufacturing; Other Electrical Equipment and Component Manufacturing
3352 Household Appliance Manufacturing
3364 Aerospace Product and Parts Manufacturing
3365 Railroad Rolling Stock Manufacturing
3366 Ship and Boat Building
3369 Other Transportation Equipment Manufacturing
3371,3372,3379
Household and Institutional Furniture and Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturing;
Office Furniture (including Fixtures) Manufacturing; Other Furniture
Related Product Manufacturing
3391 Medical Equipment and Supplies Manufacturing
3399 Other Miscellaneous Manufacturing
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Table B5: Exact crosswalk between ind1990 and NAICS (NBER-CES)
ind1990 NAICS ind1990 NAICS ind1990 NAICS
100 3116 192 3251,3259 291 3321
101 3115 200 3241 292 3329
102 3114 201 3241 310 3336
110 3111,3112 210 3262 311 3331
111 3118 211 3262 312 3331
112 3113 212 3261 320 3335
120 3121 221 3162 322 3341
121 3111,3112 222 3161,3169 340 3352
130 3122 241 3219 341 3342,3343
132 3151 242 3371,3372,3379 351 3351,3353,3359
140 3133 250 3272 352 3364
141 314 251 3273,3274 360 3366
152 314 252 3271 361 3365
160 3221 261 3271 362 3364
161 3222 262 3279 370 3369
162 3222 270 3311,3312 371 3345
180 3252 271 3315 372 3391
181 3254 272 3313 390 3399
182 3256 280 3314 391 3399
190 3255 281 3322 610 3118
191 3253 282 3323,3324
Table B6: Weighted crosswalk between ind1990 and NAICS (NBER-CES)
ind1990 NAICS Weight
150 3132 0.79
150 3131 0.21
151 3159 0.06
151 3152 0.94
172 3231 0.48
172 3231 0.33
231 3219 0.59
231 3212 0.12
231 3211 0.29
300 3323,3324 0.74
300 3328 0.26
331 3332,3334,3339 0.67
331 3327 0.33
332 3333 0.81
342 3351,3353,3359 0.33
342 3342,3343 0.67
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C Productivity effect of STEM reallocation - es-
timate results
Table C1: Non-agriculture and non-finance private sectors (data: BEA-BLS;
years: 1990, 2000, 2007, 2014)
Dependent variable: 4log(output per worker) (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(output per worker, t=1987-1989) -0.00422 -0.00315 -0.00554 0.000350
(0.0194) (0.0211) (0.0205) (0.0215)
4 log(stock of structure per worker) 0.0422 0.0188 0.0246 0.0241
(0.123) (0.119) (0.119) (0.120)
4 log(stock of equipment per worker) 0.202*** 0.214*** 0.209*** 0.221***
(0.0657) (0.0717) (0.0683) (0.0732)
4 log(employment) -0.607*** -0.51*** -0.599*** -0.581***
(0.128) (0.131) (0.128) (0.132)
4 Share of empl in STEM core occ 3.680***
(1.062)
Share of empl in STEM core occ (average t, t-1) 0.665**
(0.305)
4 Share of empl in STEM core occ with degree 3.858***
(1.258)
Share of empl in STEM core occ with degree (average t, t-1) 0.709**
(0.337)
R sq 0.517 0.549 0.511 0.536
N 159 159 159 159
Estimates weighted by initial hours worked in industry. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Additional control variables: year dummy variables, initial RTI index interacted with year dummy
variables, year-specific dummy variables for manufacturing sectors.
Table C2: Manufacturing sectors (data: NBER-CES; years: 1980, 1990, 2000,
2007)
Dependent variable: 4log(output per worker) (1) (2) (3) (4)
log(output per worker, t=1977-1979) -0.256*** -0.154** -0.236** -0.183**
(0.0880) (0.0599) (0.0896) (0.0768)
4 log(stock of structure per worker) -0.300 -0.472** -0.360* -0.452**
(0.185) (0.209) (0.198) (0.195)
4 log(stock of equipment per worker) 0.137 0.240* 0.235* 0.292**
(0.104) (0.122) (0.120) (0.127)
4 log(employment) -0.450*** -0.330*** -0.394*** -0.326***
(0.146) (0.0995) (0.104) (0.0950)
4 Share of empl in STEM core occ 8.122*
(4.510)
Share of empl in STEM core occ (average t, t-1) 5.783***
(1.815)
4 Share of empl in STEM core occ with degree 7.169**
(3.527)
Share of empl in STEM core occ with degree (average t, t-1) 6.126***
(1.808)
R sq 0.595 0.631 0.568 0.600
N 189 189 189 189
Estimates weighted by initial hours worked in industry. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01. Additional control variables: year dummy variables, initial RTI index interacted with year dummy
variables.
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